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At the 2002 Adventist Society for Religious Studies (ASRS) meetings 
in Toronto, I was interviewed as a young Adventist scholar. After talking 
about the situation of the Adventist Church in Romania during Commu-
nist times, one participant asked a straightforward question: How could 
Adventists, especially pastors and administrators, cooperate with the 
Communist authorities and still have a clear conscience; was it possible 
to cooperate with the Communists and still be a true Adventist? I offered 
him the shortest answer possible: it depends. Unfortunately, time did 
not allow me to unpack that answer. I realized that he, like many others, 
used a Free World mentality without realizing that people living under 
a Communist regime have a different worldview. I also understood that 
I needed more than words and stories to present a realistic and cred-
ible picture of the Adventist Church living under a totalitarian regime. I 
needed documents. However, the Adventist Church in Romania had only 
a small archive and most of the items were committee minutes. A few 
years later when the archives of the former secret police in Romania, Se-
curitate, were open for public and academic research, I received accredi-
tation as an external researcher. Browsing through some of the millions 
of folders and files, I discovered that Securitate had many more files and 
documents about the Adventist Church during Communist times than 
the Church did. I decided to spend as much time as I could to research 
the methods Communists used to influence the life and mission of the 
Church, and the advantages and disadvantages of the Church’s coopera-
tion with a Communist totalitarian government. This survey may help 
create a profile of the mentality and strategies used by a Communist re-
gime, a profile that could be helpful for Adventist leaders when having to 
make decisions regarding situations in totalitarian Communist countries 
today. This paper presents some of the preliminary results of my research 
in the Securitate archives in Romania. 
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Background
The Adventist Church in Romania was persecuted long before Com-
munism by both the government and the Eastern Orthodox Church. The 
records indicate that different governments treated the Church different-
ly. As long as the National Peasants party was in power they outlawed 
the Church, while the Liberal party tolerated and even recognized the 
Church. For example, in 1937 Vlad Mocanu, the Union president, and Ma-
teescu Tanase, the secretary-treasurer, were arrested because the Church 
collected funds for the needy and the orphans following the war and the 
famine in Spain. This initiative was considered “illegal” with the result 
that the leaders were put on trial. The case was finally closed on August 
29, 1939 (D6878:67-83; the cited documents follow to the Securitate filing 
system-file/volume:pages). 
Over the years not only have leaders been persecuted but lay people 
also suffered. In a village, the local elder and several Adventist families 
were arrested because they did not attend the blessing and dedication of 
an open-air shrine. They were accused of antinationalism and of spying 
for foreign governments (D6878:276). The local Orthodox priest, in his re-
port, insisted that the shrine should be considered a national symbol since 
Romania is a Christian country. 
When the first Adventist primary school was opened at Fagaras, the 
national press commented negatively (D6876:326). Every initiative of the 
Church was seen as antinational, and an Adventist school was considered 
a dangerous place for young people to study. The Romanian Orthodox 
Church was behind many government initiatives against the Catholic or 
neo-Protestant churches. They pressured the government to restrict their 
activities and deny them the right to evangelize or speak publicly about 
their beliefs (D6878:322). Before the 1941 census, Orthodox priests accused 
the Adventists of telling their friends to declare themselves members of 
the Church so the total membership would justify official recognition as a 
religious minority (D6878:326-327). 
An interesting document, dated 1941, is a post-card sent by an Ad-
ventist member to his church elder where the term “brother” was consid-
ered suspect and the secret police began an investigation (D6878:394). In 
1941 the government had rejected the support of a violent ultra-nationalist 
group called “The Brotherhood” (also known as “The Legion” or “The 
Green Shirts”). The group went from being backed by the government as 
ultra-nationalists to being hunted with their leaders sentenced to death. 
It is not difficult to understand why the term brother, used on a post-
card, was considered suspicious. The result was an unavoidable overlap 
between politics and religion.
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A Profile of Communism in Romania
A Communist regime considers religion as “the opium of the people.” 
Their strategy is to reduce a church’s activities to cause it to weaken and 
die with the final goal to create an atheistic society. However, at the same 
time they want to be seen by the rest of the world as the promoters of 
democracy and religious liberty. This contradiction of seeking to destroy 
religion while at the same time pretending that there was no religious 
persecution, existed in Romania. The Communist government of Romania 
used two institutions to attain this goal: the State Department for Reli-
gious Affairs and the secret police called the Securitate. The first was sup-
posed to promote religious freedom, while the second was the coercive 
arm of the state. After taking power, one of the main strategies of the Com-
munists was to create a commission to study each religion and confession 
in order to understand how it functioned, its strength and weaknesses, so 
a plan could be devised to destroy each group from the inside. State rep-
resentatives were sent to live with different Christian families and watch 
them for three months, after which they presented the conclusions to the 
State Department for Religious Affairs. The Securitate was supposed to 
break any resistance against the Communist government by offering only 
two options: prison, or cooperation. More than 4,000 priests and pastors, 
regardless of their religious confession, faced this choice during the first 
years of Communist power, and an estimated 10 percent died in prison. 
Many agreed to cooperate at the end of their prison time. After 1965, when 
President Ceausescu declared his independence from Moscow and the 
former USSR, the prison option became rare but recruiting clergy and lay 
people as informers for Securitate flourished.
Recruiting Securitate Informers
One of the common recruiting tactics was to send military draft notices 
or to summon a person to the local police station to check the address on 
the ID card or some other paper. Others, who submitted requests for a 
passport or visa to travel outside the country or who requested approval 
to use a typewriter, were summoned to the Securitate or Internal Affairs 
Ministry headquarters(D141/12:180). Notice how the process worked: “X 
is our agent from 1979, and demonstrated sincerity and interest in do-
ing his assignments offering useful information. . . . Because he occupies 
an important position in the administrative structure of the Adventist 
Church, we recommend that he get a visa to visit Austria, Switzerland, 
and the German Federal Republic. . . . He should be checked for any in-
tentions to not return or treason. . . . Instruct him to inform on another 
agent going on the same trip . . . and on people he will visit in Heidelberg 
(D141/12:188, 195-196, 251). 
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Some of those summoned did not even reach the local police station 
but were approached on the way and invited for talks at the Internal Af-
fairs Ministry headquarters or at a secret location. Some pastors were 
reprimanded for writing letters to people or institutions outside Romania 
without first checking with the State Department for Religious Affairs and 
were threatened with losing their jobs if they did not cooperate. A recruit-
ing session could last up to eight hours and during this time diverse psy-
chological methods were used to apply pressure. However, there were 
informers eager to cooperate on their own initiative. “X considers his pa-
triotic duty as a true Christian to cooperate in a sincere and loyal way. 
...The informer signed the agreement without hesitation, indicating his 
conscience is at peace, without conflicting his religious beliefs” (R206674 
at 04.23.1957).
Excerpts from a Recruiting Report
The scope of the recruitment: An ‘invigoration’ of the Adventist activities 
has been noticed lately with a greater number of converts, strengthened 
networking between Adventist churches all around the country, and a 
number of illegal publications. This situation requires recruiting a good 
informer who would help us control the activities of the Adventists. We 
do not have enough informers among Adventists in this county. In the 
churches it has been noticed that there is an increase in the number of in-
terests drawn by methods such as twisting the Scriptures, scaring people 
with the teaching about the Second Coming and the end of the world, and 
by making people distrustful of this life. Some propagate the teachings 
of the Adventist Reform Movement which is declared illegal in Romania.
Description of the candidate: He is objective and knows the facts. The 
candidate is a good communicator, with a sharp instinct, very analytical, 
and one who can act calmly and prudently in difficult situations. He is 
well prepared professionally and socially.
Place of recruitment: The office of the representative of the State Depart-
ment for Religious Affairs. The candidate must be convinced that coop-
erating with us is a very important and noble assignment, which can be 
given only to serious and devoted people.
A Typical File of an Informer
Other people (especially pastors) cooperated because they sensed an 
opportunity to climb the hierarchical ladder of the Adventist Church. The 
following case study is of a pastor who was already part of the conference 
administration. Initially (1964), he declined the invitation to cooperate, 
but in 1976 he accepted and is described as 
sincere, honest, sociable, communicable, changed since 1964 and now encour-
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aging parents to send their children to school on Saturday. His knowledge and 
character places him above his peer pastors, with the perspective to rise to a 
superior rank at the Union, especially due to the support of the Adventist be-
lievers in Teleorman County that represent one of the core groups of Adventist 
membership. 
It was planned that the informer candidate was to be invited to the State 
Department for Religious Affairs for talks, and on his way back he would 
be “accosted by chance” and brought to the Securitate office in order to 
impress and gain advantage over him. “If he would refuse or have doubts, 
talk to him without strings attached letting him know that we could solve 
his personal or church problems.” Finally the pastor agreed to sign the 
contract, adding that he will “keep this a secret and inform regularly.” 
In a later report, the contact officer mentions that the pastor 
reads literature and fiction novels expanding his mind, and is in complete agree-
ment with the Government’s Communist policies. He is nice looking, trustful, 
and nicely dressed. He says he is tired, overstressed, but otherwise healthy. He 
is ‘concerned’ by some of his colleagues’ comments that it was better for him to 
stay as treasurer at the Conference than to move to the Union. Earlier he object-
ed to our request to ‘challenge’ some people to talk about sensitive issues. We 
decided he was wrong and explained to him that, by the nature of his position, 
he is required by law to inform us about events that take place, in spite of his will. 
The pastor informed freely, even enthusiastically, about colleagues, 
friends, and people in the Diaspora, often inserting additional informa-
tion that was not requested by Securitate. Any time there was a chance, he 
denigrated his colleagues, especially the ones he saw as competitors for 
administrative positions or those who were better than he. In his reports, 
some names come up frequently. He makes them seem to say what he 
wishes or thinks. For example, he is frustrated that one of his colleagues 
visited the Romanian group at Marienhöhe College in Darmstadt, Germa-
ny more often than he did, and is also trusted while he is not. The pastor 
is incensed that some people consider him an informer and a traitor, and 
vehemently denies any connection with the secret police when someone 
asks him publicly and directly about other potential informers. On his 
way back to Romania he gathered information about the immigrants in 
the Romanian church in Vienna, Austria. In a report, he informed about 
the proceedings and talks at the conference constituency meeting (1989).
His last note is dated October 1989, shortly before Communism fell in 
Romania. This was during the time when mass movements and social and 
political tensions were occurring in neighboring Communist countries. 
He indicates that some Adventist believers make “inappropriate” com-
ments regarding the social movements in Hungary, and that he is “deeply 
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concerned, even indignant,” about such people who manifest an unfit 
character. He suggests that the government should take action against 
them [the union constituency meeting was coming soon, and an obedient 
and supportive attitude toward the government was explainable]. At the 
end of the report, the contact officer “suggests” that he should nominate 
those making “inappropriate” comments (R80505:1-19).
Attempts to Control the Diaspora
Some pastors informed about their trips to Western countries and also 
about Adventists in the Diaspora. Some informers received assignments 
to infiltrate Romanian Adventist churches in Vienna, Austria, and Darm-
stadt, Germany. The immigrants were encouraged to meet separately 
from the host church in order to “better preserve their national identity, to 
educate and keep them from taking any illegal steps, or publish any type 
of samizdat or unauthorized publications in order to smuggle it inside Ro-
mania.” Plans were made that an informer pastor would try to convince 
the Diaspora members to invite him and somebody else (probably another 
person trusted by Securitate) to hold Bible studies and evangelistic meet-
ings inside the United Nations Center for Immigration in Treiskirchen, 
Austria, so he could have access to and inform about illegal immigration 
to control it (D141/12:198). The Communist government tried to find out 
the various ways illegal immigrants used to exit the country (D141/12:200). 
The Securitate intended to keep Romanian Adventists in the Diaspora de-
pendent on the pastors coming from Romania, and thus maintain control 
over these groups. The immigrants were supposed to fully trust the Ro-
manian pastors, and were to be convinced that they could not solve their 
own problems without the help from Romania.
Frequently, such informer pastors would get into trouble because 
the Diaspora members would recognize their connection with the secret 
police. Such a case was reported in New York where an informer pastor 
raised suspicions when he refused to remain in the US when invited by 
several members of the Romanian community. Even the Securitate officer 
wrote on the margin: “Should we believe that everybody encouraged him 
to stay, or is he trying to convince us how devoted he is and how many 
temptations he overcame in order to return to Romania?” (D141/12:224-
225). Recognized and identified as an informer, he had to move to another 
host family because the initial one did not want to have anything to do 
with him anymore (D141/12:153). 
When people from the Diaspora wanted to send charity gifts to Ro-
mania, the informer pastors refused to accept the goods in order to 
demonstrate that people in Romania had everything they needed at home 
(D141/12:151). 
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Any pastor (or lay person) who decided to immigrate would be care-
fully monitored, and his public image tainted. Such an example is Nicusor 
Ghitescu, a seminary professor who left the country for a health problem 
but decided not to return. The Union president himself told the pastors in 
a meeting that Ghitescu was a liar, and no one should trust him because 
he had cheated the members, the Conference, the Union, and the Division 
(D141/2:238). In a letter to the General Conference (GC), the Union presi-
dent asked them not to employ Ghitescu because he was a traitor. Un-
fortunately, for a couple of years, the GC followed the Union president’s 
advice, but in the meantime Ghitescu organized a Romanian group and 
the local conference finally employed him as a pastor. Another seminary 
professor, Aristide Doroftei, found himself in a similar situation when 
the North American Division refused to employ him after receiving let-
ters from the Romanian Union President. Even Jeremiah Florea, the first 
Romanian pastor called by the GC to organize the Romanian Adventist 
Diaspora, is described in a very negative way to Robert Pierson, the GC 
president because he criticized the personality cult of the Union president. 
Other immigrant pastors were described as “leftovers,” “useless,” “false 
heroes,” and “cannot be trusted.” However, the same Union president 
sent positive recommendations for Victor Diaconescu, his friend, who had 
no problem being employed as a pastor. He even suggested that “trusted” 
pastors from Romania could be sent, if really needed.
Another case involved George Mateescu, a conference finance control-
ler, who requested permission to immigrate legally. The Securitate or-
dered the conference to fire him, and also to disfellowhip him, in order to 
discourage others from following his “negative” example. When the con-
ference fired him and he could not find another job because of his official 
request to immigrate, Mateescu went on a public strike without food, and 
wrote letters that were aired by radio Free Europe. Finally, he was allowed 
to leave the country. Even after he immigrated, Securitate made sure he 
was perceived negatively: “No one talked about him any longer, no one 
regrets him,” was written in a later report (D141/2:289). Anyone who sent 
letters to either radio Free Europe, Voice of America, or Deutsche Welle, 
was included on a list of “undesirable” people in the Ether plan to dis-
credit them in front of their peers.
Not everybody agreed to cooperate with Securitate. Some people re-
fused to become informers. Two Adventist pastors are on record for refus-
ing to provide lists with the names of people attending church services 
or the names of those who would not send their children to school on 
Saturday. They also refused to provide their daily pastoral schedule. The 
pastors replied they would do it only at the union’s request. The State 
Department for Religious Affairs representative threatened to withdraw 
21
Shaking Hands with the (D)evil 7
Dumitrescu: Shaking Hands with the (D)evil: Adventism and Communism
Published by Digital Commons @ Andrews University, 2010
their ministerial licenses. He asked them to request the union to send their 
salaries by postal money order (so the government could control their 
wages, and use that control as a leverage). One of the pastors, the treasurer 
of the conference, refused saying the union did not instruct them accord-
ingly. Later, another pastor, who agreed to cooperate with Securitate, in-
formed the state that when he tried to get the requested lists directly from 
the churches, he encountered strong resistance from the local members. 
The members told him he had no right to do this, that this was not his job. 
The informer started to preach from the Bible about the duty to obey the 
government. After the sermon, a member of the church told him he would 
not provide the information even if he would have to die.
Sometimes informers who initially agreed to provide information de-
cided to step back or openly disobey orders. The records prove that sev-
eral people were abandoned or excluded from the network of informers. 
Some continued to send and receive mail from people outside the country. 
Others deliberately did not communicate information about funds used 
in the church or in the underground networks. Some people gave only 
vague information, with no details, so their reports were considered use-
less. Others avoided the Securitate officers completely, running from them 
in the street or hiding in stores so they would not be spotted. Most of these 
people were harassed and threatened, but did not give in.
Securitate’s Strategic Plan for 1982-1983
One of the key documents for understanding how the Securitate 
worked and their strategy was the annual planning document. The Secu-
ritate yearly evaluated their activities and made specific suggestions for 
the future. For 1982-1983 they suggested that the following items be ac-
complished:
• Operation Horizon (designed by Ceausescu to use foreigners for 
presenting a positive picture of Romania) was to be strengthened, 
since it resulted in a better image of the country in the West. A visit 
by Bert B. Beach and an article in the Adventist Review, where Roma-
nian Adventists were declared “old-time Adventists,” was quoted 
as an excellent result of influencing Western entities to present a 
positive picture of Communist Romania. Plans were made to posi-
tively influence future visits in 1983 of C. L. Wilson, B. B. Beach, 
Maurice Battle, R. Nixon, and R. Neals—from the U.S.A., Burbank 
Howard—from England, and Edwin Ludescher, Gianfranco Rossi, 
Pierre Lanares, and Jean Zürcher—from Switzerland. The church 
had to inform the State Department for Religious Affairs regarding 
any visit by a foreign representative from the West. The invitation 
to visit the country had to be issued by the State Department.
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• In the spring of 1983 there was another specific plan to influence 
people from Western Europe to indirectly work for them. Jean 
Zürcher’s visit is detailed, and the plans to tell him what to say 
after getting back home are clearly spelled out. The delegation to 
the annual division meeting was also to be instructed along the 
same lines. Besides the economic, immigration, and religious top-
ics to be addressed, the delegation was supposed to contact Costica 
Balota, an outspoken Adventist supporting religious freedom in 
Romania, who was considered hostile by the Communist govern-
ment because of his letters aired by short-wave radio station Free 
Europe or sent to the U.S. Congress. The delegates were supposed 
to encourage him to stop denigrating Romania because of the gov-
ernment may impose restrictions on the free exercise of religion for 
the Adventist Church.
• The strategy included techniques for influencing people, by com-
promising, misinforming, or discouraging them. Several people 
considered reactionary and hostile (most of them immigrated 
later), were to be neutralized and their activity stopped: Octavian 
Cureteu, Nicuşor Ghiţescu, Gabriel Isaia, Titu Cazan, E. Burghelea, 
Costică Balotă, Ene Gheorghe, Geo Caraivan, etc.
• Informers with good prospects were to be trained and upgraded 
for more efficient work. Several pastors from Cluj, Mures, Sibiu, 
Dolj, and Bacau were listed.
• Foreign Adventist students who studied at Romanian Universities 
were to be contacted and recruited as informers. They were usu-
ally well received by Adventist churches and were not suspected 
of any involvement with Securitate (no one knows for sure if this 
strategy succeeded).
• People who were involved in underground or illegal activities 
were to be closely monitored. Coconcea Octavian, Grigorescu Cor-
nel, Sima Constantin, and Neacşu Ion were suspected for produc-
ing, multiplying, storing, and distributing “mystical and hostile” 
(religious) literature.
• The recruiting activity was to be accelerated in order to cover all 
churches and hot spots, and the situation of the 28 Adventists and 
29 Reform Movement Adventists spied on was also to be decided. 
During 1983 22 new Adventists and 12 new Reform Movement 
Adventists were to be recruited in order to cover the entire net-
work. When the recruiters were not able to find willing people, the 
officers made up reports and files in order to meet their quotas. 
People who never collaborated with Securitate are surprised today 
to find in the archives documents supposedly written by them.
• Of great interest were people who had access to the underground 
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networks. A quarterly evaluation was to be done, with special em-
phasis on those who had information about “illegal” or “clandes-
tine” activities. For this reason, the pastors (or future pastors) were 
targeted, and people with authority and influence among church 
members as well. Special attention was to be given to seminary 
students, or the potential candidates for administrative positions 
at the union and conference levels. Every semester the list of semi-
nary students and teachers was requested by Securitate, including 
the distance education students. Special instructions were given 
for recruiting every seminary student as an informer (D141/2:112, 
118, 119, 126, 127, 130, 131, 138).
• An atmosphere of mistrust, suspicion, dissension, was to be creat-
ed and maintained among church leaders so they would not work 
together. Divide et Impera was Securitate’s dictum.
• Very active people (or some they considered “fanatical” but who 
were evangelistically active), who would decline to cooperate with 
Securitate, would be contacted openly so church members would 
become suspicious and distrust them and so they would be iso-
lated and their influence destroyed. 
• Articles would be published in the national media describing the 
“true” intentions of the “fanatical” and “active” Adventists, so 
they would be discredited, compromised, and rejected by society. 
The factors that determined church growth were to be studied and 
strategies and methods devised to “unmask” and annihilate the 
effects of religious activities. People in factories, social organiza-
tions, schools, and institutions had to be informed periodically 
about these “antisocial” elements.
• For those who would not cooperate, special strategies—like being 
caught in illegal meetings or activities—would be employed. Spe-
cial search warrants were issued in order to discover groups meet-
ing on Sabbath in their own homes. Such people would be fined, 
and even arrested and convicted for petty crimes or felonies. 
• Dissident movements were not encouraged to develop because 
they were difficult to control. The Baptist, Pentecostal, and Breth-
ren churches had a congregational structure, so was much more 
difficult to control than the pyramidal structure of the Adventist 
church. A pyramidal structure does not help the church survive 
under totalitarian regimes or in times of trouble. The documents 
indicate many suspicious youth activities in other Congregational-
ist neo-Protestant churches, but none in the Adventist church. The 
Securitate’s control was efficient, helped by the Adventist church’s 
structure (D150/5:88). When the “Dew of the Morning,” “TKW,” 
dissident, or underground Adventist movements appeared, Secu-
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ritate made sure all levels of the church were informed and warned, 
so no new members would be attracted by such groups. The pas-
tors involved were to be kept in public view and were blacklisted 
so they would not have any influence in the church.
Control of Church Administrators
The Communist government tried to control the constituency meet-
ings at all levels of the church. Periodically, lists containing the names 
of the church boards and the number of members in each church were 
requested by the State Department and verified by the Securitate. The 
names, addresses, and phone numbers of pastors (including retirees) were 
also requested, including who else lived there or who may answer the 
phone (D141/2:122, 125). 
The documents also contain lists with names of candidates for admin-
istrative positions. Where two names for a certain position were suggested 
by the church, one was crossed out by the State Department for Religious 
Affairs or the Securitate and was never presented to the constituency 
(D141/1:175-178). Every time the constituency meeting took place, a repre-
sentative from the State Department was present to make sure the “direc-
tions” were followed. At the Bucharest Conference in 1988, the delegates 
to the constituency meeting did not agree with the proposed name offered 
by the State Department and protested vehemently. The proceedings 
continued until late at night, and when the name of the new conference 
president was announced and voted, the State Department representa-
tive, George Carstoiu, hurriedly and nervously left and slammed the door 
(D141/2:120). It was the first time in a long time that a constituency meet-
ing opposed a suggested candidate, although the records indicate that 
both candidates cooperated with the Securitate (R80496:9).
Control of Church Finances
The most effective means of control targeted the Church finances. By 
law, all the money received by any church had to be deposited in bank 
accounts. However, the money could not be used without special permis-
sion from the State Department for Religious Affairs. The approved bud-
gets did not even cover the expenses to pay a decent salary for the pastors, 
and barely covered administrative costs. Many requests for funds to repair 
church buildings or to build new ones were turned down, in many cases 
leading to the deterioration of the buildings to the point that they could no 
longer be used. The pastors’ salaries were very low, forcing some to look 
for additional sources of food and money. Some church workers raised 
honey bees and sold the honey, others functioned as photographers at 
weddings, baptisms, and funerals, while others worked part-time as farm-
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ers. This situation did not allow them to work full-time for the church, 
which was exactly what the Communists wanted. The Adventist Church 
could not employ or train new pastors without the State Department for 
Religious Affairs’ approval.
Although a religious minority, the Adventist Church had 20-30 times 
more money in tithe and offerings than the Orthodox Church. The Com-
munists tried to annul the tithing system, but finally realized it was one of 
the basic Adventist doctrines. Instead, they tried to suffocate the Church 
financially. Faced with such restrictions, the leadership of the Church de-
cided to create a parallel financial system. Only part of the tithe and offer-
ings would be recorded, while the rest entered a secret circuit (called the 
secret pocket) designed to help the Church survive and fulfill its mission. 
At a ministerial meeting, a conference president publicly suggested that 
each church should retain funds for their local needs because the National 
Bank would not give cash for repairs, heating, or other local expenses. 
One informer added his interpretation to the communiqué (which the 
government was happy to hear): “The proposal suggests churches should 
avoid the state audit and control at any cost, so they could use the funds 
as they wish. The conference president wanted to be seen as a hero, having 
the courage to challenge the government” (D141/12:164). 
This system functioned between 1950 and 1958 when the Securitate ar-
rested all the leaders of the union and conferences and tried them publicly 
for stealing the money of the believers. This was a clear attempt to give 
the Adventist Church negative publicity. However, the trial concluded 
that the funds were not stolen, so the Communist government accused 
them of mishandling the money and using it for other purposes (since an 
important part of the money went to the local representatives of the State 
Department for Religious Affairs as “gifts,” the Securitate did not crack 
down on the parallel system for almost eight years). The new Adventist 
leadership was forced to accuse their brothers in court and make efforts to 
“recover” the money. Stefan Nailescu and Arthur Vacareanu, the former 
president and treasurer were sentenced to 10 and 8 years in prison, while 
the other 23 leaders were released. It was a clear attempt of the Commu-
nist government to decapitate the Church and give it bad press. Later, the 
secret system was applied on a local basis, so that financial committees 
could cover local church expenses.
The Intellectuals Seen as a Threat
Securitate paid a special attention to educated church people. Intel-
lectuals were particularly targeted and spied on. Church elders in this 
category are mentioned from all neo-Protestant churches and the fol-
lowing Adventists are named: Paul Gheorghe, Sandu Stroescu, Paul Bu-
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jor, Ene Paulini, Chiru Tudorel, Aron Mureşan, and Lorand Szentagotai 
(D150/5:82). Some of them are listed because of their evangelistic abili-
ties (Paulina Arcuş from Roman, and  Aron Mureşan from Tulcea), others 
for their musical talents (Vasile and Doina Cazan at Cluj and Chinari), 
while others taught children in the various churches (Cornelia Orban at 
Craiova) (D150/5:85-87). A 1985 statistic made by the State Department of 
Religious Affairs shows that from a total of 4,445 neo-Protestant intellectu-
als, 2,583 were Baptists, 864 were Adventists (325 in Bucharest), 536 were 
Pentecostals, and 462 belonged to the Brethren (D150/5:92-93). 
Sermons as Coded Language
During the 1950s and 1960s the State Department for Religious Lib-
erty had inspectors present at worship services to take notes and control 
what was said. Many times they would summon the pastor and ask for 
explanations regarding certain terms used in the sermon. For example, 
if the sermon focused on the parable of the talents, the inspector would 
accuse the pastor of using coded language by which he meant U.S. dol-
lars, and the members understood the message about capitalism being 
God’s favorite economic system. Poets were also a target for Communist 
authorities because they could easily use metaphors and symbols with a 
double meaning.
Controlled Education
Adventist professors and children in state schools (no private schools 
were allowed during Communism) were harassed and humiliated. The 
case of school no. 25 in Galati is relevant. Ilie Ranghilof was the executive 
director and was also an Adventist. Together with Stefan Ouatu and Ma-
ria Ciuplea, two other Adventist teachers, the three were accused of prop-
agating Christian doctrines among the students and also of registering 
too many Adventist students in the school, such as Preda Marius, Felea 
Gheorghe, Olteanu Leonard, Zotoiu Aida, Olteanu Lorina, Graur Sigilda. 
The officials were concerned because on Sabbath the students would be in 
church and sang in the choir. They accused director Ranghilof of taking 
bribes from these students and their parents because he had been spot-
ted traveling in their cars or borrowing their cars, was frequently called 
at home by them, or receiving “gifts” from them (the students and the 
director participated in literature distribution or church activities). The 
parents of the other children were suspicious and envious. The Securi-
tate decided to scatter the Adventist students among several other schools 
(D141/12:41). Adventists children were frequently harassed because they 
did not attend school on Saturday. Their citizenship grades were lowered, 
as well as the other grades in order to force them to repeat the school year 
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and not finish their education.
In order to control children’s education, the Communist government 
declared children’s Sabbath School and youth programs illegal. For more 
than thirty years the Adventist Church was faced with the impossibility 
of educating their children in religious matters. Therefore, the religious 
education in the family became of paramount importance. In the 1980s, 
when Magdalena Dumitrescu, the wife of the Union treasurer, began un-
officially reorganizing the children’s Sabbath School, she was threatened, 
and her house was often searched for translated, typed, or photocopied 
material. This happened because her husband would bring Sabbath 
School material from the Euro-Africa Division, which was translated and 
circulated among the churches. While the children would learn in their 
Sabbath school classes, some parents watched at the doors for intruders or 
informers. Every time such an uninvited guest arrived, teaching materials 
disappeared and the topic was changed or the kids started singing.
The Youth Hour was changed into a music meeting, but similar pro-
grams took place under a different umbrella. The Securitate archives con-
tain hundreds of musical programs from churches in Bucharest, with the 
names of the people involved and every song and word that was uttered. 
Similarly, there are notes on many sermons preached in various churches 
in the large cities (some were even recorded on tape).
Social and Private Life Spied On
Many Romanian Adventists used to gather once a year in the country 
for a week-end, something similar to a camp meeting. They would go to 
a traditional place, such as a clearing in the woods where fields of white 
narcissus grew. The Securitate archives reveal that informers were pres-
ent even there. Pastor Cornel Constantinescu, the organizer, is mentioned, 
as are pastors from other districts (i.e., Dan Popovici Basarab), as well as 
the members and visitors from other parts of the country. The plate num-
bers of the buses and cars of those who came were listed (for example, in 
1982 buses and cars from Dambovita, Arges, Prahova, and Ialomita coun-
ties were present, as well as from Bucharest). During the summer, church 
youth from different parts of the country used to meet and organize sum-
mer camps. Such meetings were considered suspect and illegal, and many 
times the young people had to move to another area or to go home early 
due to reports filed with the local police and authorities who enforced the 
orders.
From Bibles to Toilet Paper
Religious literature was drastically controlled, especially Bibles. Bibles 
could not be printed in Romania during the Communist era. However, 
28
Journal of Adventist Mission Studies 14
Journal of Adventist Mission Studies, Vol. 6 [2010], No. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/jams/vol6/iss1/3
they were printed in the West and smuggled into the country using dif-
ferent venues. Bibles had to be stored in inconspicuous places, sometimes 
even under building materials out in the courtyard. Although they would 
sometimes get wet or moldy, people were extremely happy to own a Bi-
ble. Most Bibles came hidden in the cargo barges on the Danube River, 
wrapped in plastic tarps, and abandoned at night at predetermined un-
populated areas where people were waiting in the bushes to collect them. 
Traian Aldea wrote his memories about those dangerous but rewarding 
trips to the Danube shores (Aldea 2002). However, later Securitate had 
informers who provided information on the whole operation. The last 
known shipment of Bibles on the Danube was seized, people arrested, 
and the Bibles sent to a paper factory and reprocessed into toilet paper. 
However, Bibles continued to come in cars and trucks with double walls 
or compartments.
People like Alexandru Sima, Gheorghe Alexandru, Cornel Grigore-
scu, Neacsu Ion, Octavian Coconcea, Radu Grigorescu, and many others 
risked their lives in order to provide, print, and distribute religious litera-
ture. Others were contact persons, or simply covering for those who were 
risking their lives. Many times the Communist printing presses were the 
very places where religious literature was printed or copied. The State 
Department for Religious Affairs would approve 3,000 Sabbath School 
Quarterlies to be printed for all 65,000 Adventist members. With great 
risks (and usually great sums of additional money), the editor Octavian 
Coconcea would persuade the printers to run 30,000 more (D141/2:345). 
Even the Church administrators were scared because of the risks posed 
by such high numbers of printed copies. The disproportion soon became 
evident for Securitate, who followed the leads of the network. The same 
story happened again and again. The inside informers filed reports, but 
local representatives of the State Department were bribed, in order not to 
report what was happening to higher levels. There were instances when 
Securitate became suspicious and cracked down on the whole network. 
Some people were arrested, the printers lost their jobs, and the church 
representative had to be moved or demoted.
When the church needed more than Sabbath School Quarterlies, or 
daily devotionals, an underground network stepped in. People who knew 
English or French would get hold of a book and start translating it into 
Romanian. Others would type the manuscript on old manual typewriters, 
with up to 15 copies at a time on special thin paper. Then others would 
bind the books and distribute them. During the 1980s, when photocopi-
ers became available in Romania at certain state institutions, the under-
ground network would pay the person who was supposed to guard the 
photocopiers in order to allow them to make more copies from one of 
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the typed manuscripts. Usually such persons were the Securitate agents 
themselves, for they were human, too. It is also true that religious litera-
ture was unknowingly produced by the Securitate itself. Some books and 
brochures were printed at the Casa Scanteii (the Spark House) where 
Communist propaganda materials were printed (D141/3:218). Many times 
informers would write reports about people who were seen visiting the 
house where a printer at Casa Scanteii lived. A good number of visitors 
were Adventists from the underground network. However, the inform-
ers indicated exactly where the copying machines were located and sug-
gested that these should be tightly controlled.
Demolition of Church Buildings
The government ordered that church buildings be demolished in spite 
of the member’s fierce opposition or the presence of representatives from 
the U.S. Embassy. The story of the Grant Church in Bucharest is typical. 
Letters to Nicolae Ceausescu, the then President of Romania, and to the 
government had no effect. Suggestions from high ranking architects to 
move the buildings on rails were rejected. Members barricaded them-
selves inside the building, although electricity, water, and sewage had 
been cut off. Women and children formed a human chain around the 
building so bulldozers could not push forward. Church members threat-
ened to meet and worship in the ruins if the building was demolished. 
The tension reached its peak when authorities brought a crane in order to 
tear the roof off the building, but the members together with children and 
women stood on the roof. President Ceausescu himself had to come and 
assess the situation from a distance. He ordered the building demolished 
at any cost, even if the people would be harmed. The strategy was to place 
a trusted person among the members who would report on a time when 
vigilance would be low and who would open the gates of the compound 
so the soldiers and prison inmates surrounding the building could enter. 
Unfortunately, the pastor himself was the one to convince the members to 
allow an engineer to stay with them under the promise to help them better 
resist. Less than 48 hours later, the “engineer” opened the gates and the 
crowds flowed inside, crushing the resistance, hurting people, breaking 
doors and windows, and making the building unusable. The pastor was 
“rewarded” by being allowed to travel outside the country and meet his 
brother who lived in the West. His name is not even mentioned in the re-
ports regarding the events. The church moved and functioned in a tent for 
the following ten years, because no building permit was given to rebuild.
A year later (1987), another Adventist church in Bucharest was sched-
uled to be demolished, together with the union headquarters, the semi-
nary, and the publishing house, but because of other social protest move-
30
Journal of Adventist Mission Studies 16
Journal of Adventist Mission Studies, Vol. 6 [2010], No. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/jams/vol6/iss1/3
ments in the country, Ceausescu’s attention was diverted. However, 
reports indicate that members threatened to meet in their own houses and 
apartments if the church was demolished, which the government feared. 
U.S. Embassy counsels frequently visited the union headquarters, and 
this, too, delayed the demolition. The names of Mrs. Susan Sutton, secre-
tary of the U.S. Embassy, and Martin Wernic, from the U.S. State Depart-
ment, and other diplomats from the political section of the Embassy are 
mentioned.
Other churches did not benefit from the visits of Western diplomats. 
The Communist government refused to authorize building permits for 
churches or delayed them as long as they could. Until 1990, only 525 Ad-
ventist churches existed officially, but the number doubled overnight after 
Communism fell. That shows how many churches and people met “ille-
gally” until they had the chance to have their own building. Usually the 
members met in private houses and sometimes even in high rise apart-
ments. This worked well for house churches, but members fought hard 
to have a building they could call “church” because of the mentality of 
Eastern Orthodox people who would never feel comfortable worshiping 
in an apartment or private house.
The records show only a few situations in which the members built 
their churches without permits, only to be fined and to face the prospect of 
having the church demolished, but there were many such instances. The 
situation at Sepreus, Arad, became very tense when the Communist au-
thorities ordered the church to vacate the building which was almost fin-
ished, and brought bulldozers to raze it. The mothers with their children 
stood in the way of the bulldozers and, in the end, the bulldozer drivers 
refused to hurt anyone and left. The authorities had no alternative but to 
give a building permit and allow the members to finish construction. The 
same situation happened at Oinacu, Giurgiu (D141/12:80, 141, 239).
Conclusions
This short survey of documents in the Securitate archives illustrates 
some of the methods the Communist government used in an attempt to 
destroy the structure of the Adventist Church in Romania and the reli-
gious faith of Adventist Christians. Although pretending to guarantee 
religious freedom, the government used the Securitate forces to restrict 
religious activities, demolish church buildings, reduce the number of wor-
ship services, confiscate and destroy religious literature, control church 
finances, infiltrate the Diaspora, manipulate church leadership selection, 
and recruit informers in order to control and finally destroy the Church 
from the inside. By God’s grace, the Romanian Adventist Church not only 
survived but grew in spite of such tactics and Communist persecution.
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The survey also indicates advantages and disadvantages of cooperat-
ing with an oppressive regime. Every political and social system has its 
weaknesses that can be used in order to pursue the mission of the Church. 
The question regarding the morality of such cooperation must be judged 
against the prospect of the Church’s survival under Satan’s relentless at-
tacks. The understanding of the Great Controversy offers the correct per-
spective. In my opinion the issue should not be “if” but “how far” the 
Church should go to shake hands with an oppressive regime. The biblical 
stories of Daniel, Esther, Nehemiah, and Joseph offer valuable help.
Finally, the research demonstrates that the pyramidal structure of the 
Adventist Church is very vulnerable when a dictatorial or oppressive 
regime infiltrates it and compromises its leadership. Communists have 
sought to divide the church in order to destroy it. Romanian history, as 
well as of other Communist countries, shows that cutting contact with 
world leadership and isolating a national or local church is one way gov-
ernments use to gain control over a church structure. The separation and 
mistrust between the official church and the underground movement is 
part of the same strategy. The Adventist Church should create a strategy 
that will help its members survive by allowing flexibility in its present 
structure and focusing on the autonomy and self-sustaining power of the 
local church rather than building an administrative hierarchy. In the fu-
ture, additional research may contribute to help design such a master plan 
or a list of guidelines to be used when dealing with Communist regimes 
in countries that presently control 25 percent of the world’s population. I 
believe that God is in control and that he will never let his church down. 
But it is our human responsibility to learn from the lessons of the past in 
order to be prepared and ready for unexpected events in the future.
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